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INTRODUCTION
At a time when too many are offering simplistic solutions to
difficult problems, Judge Marrero has tackled one of the most
intractable contemporary legal conundrums in a way that recognizes its
multiple dimensions and complex underlying causes. His Essay 1 shows
us that a full understanding of litigation abuse can only come from a
deep inquiry into the motivations and incentives of all those involved,
not just the senior litigators who “run” big cases, but also their partners
and associates, their clients, the judges before whom they appear, and
the broader legal and social environment in which their actions take
place. Judge Marrero analyzes these relationships from numerous
perspectives: legal, social, economic, and psychological, and examines
the full panoply of current litigation practices, not just the most

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016).
Despite its length, Judge Marrero styles his piece as an “Essay,” and appropriately so in two
senses. It is an “assay” or survey of all the complex factors that shape contemporary big case
litigation, and also an “essay” (i.e. an attempt, to show how they are systematically related to
one another). See Essay, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
essay [https://perma.cc/U4AP-FHGU] (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
†
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egregious conduct. 2 The result is an important addition to the literature
on litigation abuse and a useful corrective to many previous analyses
that have focused too narrowly on small portions of the bigger problem.
My contribution to this special issue seeks to explicate the virtues of the
complexity of Judge Marrero’s analysis in light of ongoing debates over
discovery abuse and related topics.
Complaints about lawyers’ litigation tactics are hardly new.
Nowhere else in American legal practice has there been such a wide and
persistent gap between the way members of the judiciary and leaders of
the bar say that lawyers should conduct their professional activities and
the way that those activities are actually conducted. 3 Judges and law
reformers have been complaining about litigators’ conduct (primarily,
but not limited to, pretrial discovery tactics) for at least fifty years. 4 The
problem is often described as the penchant of practicing litigators to
engage in “gamesmanship” or excessive “adversarial maneuver.” 5 This is
said to be particularly present in pretrial discovery practice, the most
extensive and expensive part of most contemporary litigation. This
results in overbroad and unnecessary discovery requests followed by
grudging, overly technical responses laced with questionable objections,
delay, and sometimes, strategic inundation of the other side with piles of
useless information. 6 While there have been many revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) in the past fifty years in
efforts to ameliorate this problem, it is generally recognized that none
have been particularly successful. 7
At the heart of the problem is the strange disconnect between the
way most judges and many lawyers say that litigation should be
Marrero, supra note 1.
The most striking recent illustration of this disparity between legal norms and
contemporary litigation practice is the “Cooperation Proclamation” issued by the prestigious
Sedona Conference. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION
PROCLAMATION (July 2008), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/
Opening_Grossman_Maura.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B458-ZYC6]
[hereinafter
SEDONA
COOPERATION PROCLAMATION]. The Sedona Proclamation seeks to promote cooperation
rather than the “escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but
unproductive discovery disputes” it describes as common litigation practice. Id. at 1. The
Sedona Proclamation asserts that such cooperation is already legally required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), but also recognizes that, if adopted in practice, it
would constitute a “paradigm shift” in contemporary discovery conduct. Id. at 3.
4 Although Roscoe Pound complained about excessive contentiousness in his famous 1906
speech, Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), until 1970, when the Federal Rules regarding disclosure were
substantially expanded, “clamor about overly burdensome discovery was not particularly
prominent.” Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1710
(2014).
5 Marcus, supra note 4, at 1710.
6 See, e.g., SEDONA COOPERATION PROCLAMATION, supra note 3.
7 For a brief history of the Federal Rules amendments regarding discovery practice, see
Marcus, supra note 4, at 1710–26; see also Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on
Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004).
2
3
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conducted and what actually occurs in the world of big case litigation,
where abusive, wasteful, dilatory, and unnecessary stratagems are said to
be extremely common, if not actually the norm. 8 The question, of
course, is why. Why do practicing litigators continue to engage in
conduct that judges are constantly warning them against, and about
which they themselves frequently complain? Much has been written on
this critical topic by practicing lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. Even
economists and psychologists have had their say. 9 Yet no satisfactory
answer has emerged.
Instead, we have many theories, based on many different and
frequently contradictory accounts of the motives for lawyer
misbehavior, most of which either fail to answer or assume away the
most fundamental questions. One such fundamental question is what
lawyers actually believe when they engage in contentious litigation. Do
they think they are helping their clients win? Or are they instead giving
full reign to their own aggressive instincts? Or really seeking to boost
firm billings or personal prestige? The ethical rules tell us that lawyers
should generally put their clients’ interests first, 10 but such ethical norms
do not necessarily describe how real lawyers operate in actual litigation
practice. Economic theory, in contrast, models a world in which
lawyers, like other rational actors, are always seeking to maximize their
own pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. But such models famously
oversimplify the complexity of real human interactions and motives.
Judge Marrero presents a more realistic world in which lawyers
8 It is important to recognize that, for all that they dominate discussion of contemporary
litigation practice, the problems of discovery abuse and dissatisfaction with pretrial practice
primarily involve so-called “big case” practice—high stakes lawsuits involving large
corporations or other large institutions. Studies by the Federal Judicial Center and others have
consistently shown that there is another category of “ordinary” federal litigation involving
smaller litigants and smaller amounts in controversy that do not seem to pose the same
problems. Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525 (1998); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785 (1998). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences
for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994). Judge Marrero’s concerns also center
on big case practice, but unlike many other commentators, he believes the costs and delays
associated with such practice have negative effects on the entire judicial system. Marrero, supra
note 1, at 1607.
9 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 (2018) (Rule 1.3). Lawyers’ ethical
obligations towards clients have been changed in recent years. The famous requirement of
“zealous advocacy” has been dropped, first from the ABA Model Rules, and then in states like
New York. See Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened to “Zealous Advocacy”?, N.Y.L.J. (2011).
The current Preamble to the New York Rules expressly requires lawyers to balance their
obligations to clients and to the judicial system. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl.
¶ 1-3 (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2009). Judge Marrero’s Essay, of course, is a powerful reminder
that such ethical rules may not be the strongest motivation for actual lawyers’ conduct.
Marrero, supra note 1.
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constantly face multiple conflicting constraints and incentives. The
desire to maximize revenue from billings constitutes one form of
incentive. A desire for status and prestige, both within the firm and
beyond, creates another. The professional and legal obligations of
contract and fiduciary duty provide incentives of their own, as do
lawyers’ interactions with judges and opposing counsel. Any of these
may constitute the dominant motivation for a particular litigation
decision. Different types of clients and different types of cases may also
have substantial impact on lawyers’ incentives and motivations. A
lawyer representing a corporation with an active and sophisticated
general counsel will make decisions about litigation strategy differently
than one whose client is an injured layperson who has signed a
contingency fee agreement or a litigious real estate developer who
engages in frequent contractual disputes.
An equally fundamental question is whether lawyers who engage in
abusive litigation tactics do so from rational or irrational motives. Both
views are plausible, but also raise difficult theoretical problems. 11 Those
who view such conduct as rational cannot deny that it is also frequently
self-defeating, leading to increased costs and delay for both sides.
Moreover, it clearly has the tendency to make judges extremely angry,
both at the lawyers who engage in it and their clients. But, if contentious
litigation behavior is not rational but merely an unpleasant reflection of
lawyers’ irrational aggression, ego, and anger at annoying conduct by
the other side, why has it been so hard to convince lawyers to abandon
such wasteful practices and litigate in more productive and cooperative
ways? Given these difficulties in understanding the nature and causes of
abusive litigation tactics, it is not surprising that the efforts to combat
them have proven to be so ineffective.
Judge Marrero’s Essay provides important and productive new
ways to think about these issues. Judge Marrero is not a theoretician
proposing a new model of lawyer behavior. He is a careful observer and
participant in the real world of litigation practice. Like everyone
concerned about the problems of cost and delay in abusive litigation, he
looks to understand the nature of the problem and its causes. He does
this, however, not by focusing on a narrow set of particularly egregious
misbehaviors or by seeking the presumed fundamental cause of lawyer
11 Various commentators have put forth ingenious theories to explain the strange mixture
of motivations that might explain contemporary discovery practices. Some have invoked the
complexities of game theory and problems like the prisoners’ dilemma. See infra notes 69–70
and accompanying text. Others point to potential conflicts between the lawyers’ interests and
those of their clients. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994). Still,
others maintain that litigation is not, and never has been, a purely rational process, and that a
certain sort of aggressive posturing, even if irrational, may provide a strange but unique benefit
to the lawyers and parties who engage in it. See, e.g., Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An
Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1996).
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misconduct. He looks broadly at all the things that lawyers do in pretrial
practice and all the ways they are problematic. He also looks at all the
potential causes, conflicts, and concerns that may influence lawyer
behavior, both the rational and irrational. What he finds with this
refreshing and interesting approach is complexity.
As a general matter, lawyers, more than most professionals, tend to
distrust complexity. We like to keep our arguments clear and simple and
focused on a few major points. Legal academics also recognize that to
understand and effectively teach complicated legal ideas, we frequently
need to simplify them, which we do through abstract hypotheticals,
economic models, pithy topic sentences, and other well-known tools of
the legal trade. There are times, however, when simplification becomes
oversimplification, when our hypotheticals and economic models no
longer accurately reflect the real-world phenomenon we are seeking to
explain. It is in such situations that recognizing and analyzing
complexity becomes a virtue, a way to broaden perspectives and shed
new light on intractable existing problems.
What Judge Marrero’s essay brings to the tired debates over
litigation misconduct is a new, broader, and more complex perspective,
which views the problem not merely as one of discovery abuse, violation
of Federal Rules, or even lack of courtesy and cooperation among
counsel. His perspective sweeps in the entire scope of contemporary
litigation practice, from complaint drafting to pretrial motions to
discovery and post-discovery motions, from billing practices to law firm
structure to fee shifting rules. It is a complex and multi-faceted
perspective, and one from which no easy answers emerge. But it is also
one that potentially leads to promising new ways of thinking about the
problem of litigation misconduct and, indeed, about the entire structure
of our system of civil justice.
Judge Marrero’s Essay broadens and complicates our
understanding of the nature of litigation misconduct in four useful
ways. First, he disaggregates the litigation decision-making process.
Whereas most analyses assume that there is a single person, generally a
senior litigation partner at a large private law firm, making the critical
litigation decisions, Judge Marrero recognizes that such decisions are, in
fact, the result of systemic pressures, interests, and demands by a
number of important actors, not just outside senior litigation counsel,
but also the client (frequently in the form of sophisticated in-house
corporate counsel), other members of the firm (like billing partners,
senior associates, and junior partners), and, increasingly, technical
outside firms handling significant matters like electronic discovery.
Such a complex and potentially conflicting set of decision-makers is
likely to produce unexpected and frequently problematic litigation
decisions.
Second, Judge Marrero employs an extremely broad definition of
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litigation “abuse.” It encompasses not just the egregious conduct over
pretrial discovery that has received most attention (and has been the
subject of most of the tinkering with the Federal Rules). Judge Marrero’s
conception of litigation abuse includes the entire scope of pretrial
practice: pleadings, motions, as well as all forms of discovery. It includes
every litigation tactic he finds wasteful, unnecessary, contentious, or
dilatory. In effect, Judge Marrero measures contemporary litigation
practice against the ideals set forth in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules, that
litigation should be “construed, administered, and employed” in order
“to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.” 12 Any litigation tactic that falls short of that
goal, whether by imposing unnecessary costs or delay, or otherwise
preventing fair and speedy resolution of disputes, becomes a subject of
his concern.
In certain respects, as I argue later in this piece, I think Judge
Marrero may be painting with too broad a brush, 13 yet the usefulness of
his broad definition of abusive litigation cannot be denied. He avoids
scapegoating any particular category of lawyer as the root of all evil and
source of the most egregious pretrial misconduct. 14 Judge Marrero is an
equal opportunity accuser, and he spreads the blame around to include
defense counsel who file ponderous motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment with low probabilities of success, as well as any lawyer who
refuses to pick up the phone and talk to opposing counsel before
embarking on some costly and unnecessary litigation tactic. His
approach also allows us to see that the problem is not overly lenient
discovery or complaint drafting rules, but a problem of lawyer
motivation, a motivation to impose unnecessary costs and delay that
manifests itself throughout various stages of the litigation process.
The complexity of Judge Marrero’s analysis also includes a more
sophisticated approach to the psychology of lawyers. He rejects the
simplistic dichotomy between rational and irrational motives. The
litigators he describes certainly do not act with complete rationality, but
their actions do reflect cognizable goals and motivations which can be
uncovered and analyzed, even if the lawyers themselves might not admit
them. Although far from an economic determinist, Judge Marrero
knows that money matters, and that the lawyer who is filing that 10012 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. It should be noted that Rule 1 places this obligation not only on the
Courts interpreting the Rules, but on “the parties.” Id.
13 See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text (arguing that some weak dispositive
motions may still be justifiable and appropriate).
14 In big case litigation with information asymmetries, complaints that focus on
“overdiscovery” or “fishing expeditions” usually view plaintiffs’ counsel as the source of such
problems. When the concerns allege delay and document destruction, it is usually defense
counsel who are identified as the culprits. See generally Joseph L. Ebersole & Barlow Burke,
Discovery Problems in Civil Cases, FED. JUD. CTR. (1980); Charles Yablon, Byte Marks: Making
Sense of New F.R.C.P. 37(e), 69 FLA. L. REV. 571 (2017).
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page summary judgment brief based on rather weak arguments,
insisting that it is in the client’s interest to do so, is surely aware of just
how many billable hours and potential revenue that magnum opus
represents to her firm. Similarly, Judge Marrero knows that lawyers are
human. They get angry. They get frustrated (sometimes even with
judges), and when that happens they do and say things that may not be
in their or their clients’ best long-term interests. The point is that Judge
Marrero’s approach recognizes that any model of lawyer behavior that
excludes self-interested pecuniary motivations or occasional irrational,
even self-defeating bursts of anger and aggression would not be an
accurate depiction of the way lawyers act in real litigation practice. His
broad systemic analysis provides a more complex and accurate account
of the way these various motives interact to cause harm to the litigation
process.
Finally, Judge Marrero recognizes that there is not just one
problem of litigation abuse, but multiple problems15 engendered by the
different ways lawyers’ motivations can interact with the possibilities
presented in different types of cases, with different adversaries, and
before different tribunals. The case that gives rise to burdensome and
wasteful discovery may not be the same kind of case in which
defendants make weak and unnecessary motions for summary
judgment, yet for Judge Marrero these are both troubling instances of
litigation abuse.
By taking this approach, Judge Marrero challenges much of the
prevailing literature, which has attempted to portray litigation abuse as
primarily a problem of pretrial discovery and one that is generally
limited to “asymmetric” types of tort litigation, e.g., securities and
employment discrimination. 16 By painting with a much broader brush,
Judge Marrero enables us to see that the same motivations that can
cause excessive and wasteful discovery practices can just as easily lead to
waste and excess in other aspects of pretrial litigation conduct. He
usefully avoids an overly narrow focus on the misconduct of a particular
category of lawyer in favor of an approach which recognizes that
existing fee structures create problematic incentives for many different
types of lawyers. He also recognizes that different lawyers, in different
types of cases, will have different types of problematic incentives. This is
15 More precisely, I would say that, while Judge Marrero views the fundamental problem as
the skewed incentives that litigators face in conducting big cases, he sees those skewed
incentives as a constellation of forces that push and pull litigation in different directions,
manifesting as different types of problems in different types of cases. See infra notes 72–81 and
accompanying text.
16 See Rodney A. Satterwhite & Matthew J. Quatrara, Asymmetrical Warfare: The Cost of
Electronic Discovery in Employment Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2008); Charles Yablon
& Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the Resolution of
Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 726–27
(2012).
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indeed the virtue of complexity.
The lack of a single overarching problem also implies that there can
be no single overarching solution. The complex motivations that lead
lawyers to different sorts of abusive litigation tactics in different cases
means that no quick fix, no change in fee structures or amendment to
the Federal Rules, will have much of an impact on the overall system.
Indeed, such changes, if they benefit some types of lawyers in some
types of cases over others, may do more harm than good. Rather, the
key to improving litigation conduct in contemporary lawsuits is to
recognize, as Judge Marrero does, the highly individualized nature of
the decisions lawyers make when litigating cases. Every case is indeed
different, and every reasonably competent lawyer adjusts their tactics
based on many factors, including the amounts at stake, the perceived
likelihood of success on the merits, the competence and resources of the
adversaries and their lawyers, and the attitudes and preferences of the
judges. Judge Marrero’s essay expands that list of relevant
considerations, proposing that lawyers’ conduct is also influenced by
their need to generate substantial fees through the litigation, by a felt
need to look and be “aggressive” both for psychological reasons and to
impress certain types of clients, and by the failure of judges and court
procedures to instill in lawyers sufficient appreciation of the social costs
of litigation waste and delay.
Undoubtedly, there is lots of room for improvement. However,
improvements will come not from one big “silver bullet” solution, but
from many smaller adjustments that create many more individual cases
in which it is no longer in the client’s or the lawyer’s interest to seek
delay or promote unnecessary conflict or excessive costs. Some of this
can be promoted by changes in existing attorney-client fee structures
and control of litigation, others by changes in fee shifting rules. Rule
changes that give judges and magistrate judges greater control to limit
and regulate discovery can play a role, as can greater judicial willingness
to supervise such discovery and exercise more of the discretion they
already have.
This piece is divided into five Parts. The first four will discuss,
analyze, and expand on what I consider the four important ways Judge
Marrero’s piece adds complexity to our understanding of contemporary
litigation practice: (1) the increasing disaggregation of litigation
decision-making; (2) the expansion of the conception of what practices
constitute litigation abuse; (3) a recognition of the psychological
complexity of the motives for litigation tactics; and (4) the disparate
ways litigation abuse appears in different types of cases. Then, after a
brief interlude to consider what can be learned from the experience of
the “rocket dockets” in some federal district courts, the final Part will
look at the ways in which Judge Marrero’s more complex understanding
of the problems of our contemporary litigation system can point the

2018]

VI R T U E S O F C O M P L E X I T Y

241

way to useful improvements.
I. THE DISAGGREGATION OF LITIGATION
While noting the longevity of the problem of litigation abuse, Judge
Marrero’s Essay pays considerable attention to the changes in the legal
profession during the last few decades, with particular emphasis on
changes in big firm practice. The fundamental shift here is that
litigation, once a slightly disreputable and relatively insignificant part of
big firm practice, maintained primarily as a service to the big corporate
clients whose financial work provided the bulk of the firm’s revenue
stream, had by 1985 become a profit center in itself. 17 He notes that:
Intercorporate litigation was then not only not avoided or frowned
upon, but rather broadly and tightly embraced by corporate clients
and attorneys as a major part of commercial business strategy and
counsel’s tactical tools. In fact, litigation became a calculated means
for private enterprises—and law firms—to further their competitive
ends. . . . Practitioners have employed litigation not only to promote
justice and advance the interests of clients, but also, perhaps to a
larger degree than was previously the case, to further three selfserving ends: to fill in the law firms’ revenue gaps created by
corporate work lost both to in-house counsel and to clients’ new
policies for hiring and monitoring outside attorneys, to enhance law
firms’ business models now more motivated by attorneys’
individualistic impulses, and to survive the more rigorous
competition and fiercer Darwinian ends of modern law practice. 18

The argument here may first appear somewhat counterintuitive. If,
as Judge Marrero plausibly suggests, the post-1985 period was one in
which corporate general counsel were playing a greater role in “hiring
and monitoring outside attorneys,” how were those same outside
counsel able to indulge their “individualistic impulses” to conduct
litigation in a way that drove up costs and thereby “fill[ed] in the law
firms’ revenue gaps?” 19 After all, a basic role of in-house corporate
counsel is to monitor expenditures to outside firms and make sure that
money is spent efficiently. As Judge Marrero notes, “[a]s the functions
and authority of in-house law departments grew,” one result was that
“the corporate law business that clients awarded to outside counsel
declined.” 20 Yet this increased oversight by in-house counsel does not
17 Marrero, supra note 1 at 1621–22. See also Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private
Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 942
(1993).
18 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1621–22.
19 Id. at 1622.
20 Id. at 1621, 1619 n.63 (quoting studies indicating that firm partners could “bill only time
and tasks that would survive in-house counsel’s . . . scrutiny,” and that “smaller, more routine
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seem to have restrained litigation costs but has exacerbated them. How
was this possible?
The key is that the increased role of corporate counsel did not have
the same impact on all types of big firm legal work, or even all types of
litigation. Its primary effect was on transactional work, the negotiation
and preparation of financing contracts and securities law disclosures
that had dominated big firm practice in the postwar period. Much of
this work had become increasingly standardized and repetitive and
could therefore be treated by in-house counsel as a commodity to be
parceled out on an individual basis to the lowest bidder (or to in-house
counsel). 21 Corporate partners whose revenues had once been based on
a steady stream of “deals” coming into the firm from loyal clients found
that they now had to compete for each new transaction with “dog and
pony shows” against other firms, with the work generally going to the
lowest bidder. 22 Litigation was different because every case was different,
or at least could be presented to clients that way.
Judge Marrero’s close look at the changes in big firm litigation
practice reveals a certain level of, if not outright deception, at least
informational asymmetry between in-house counsel who monitor and
assign litigation and outside litigation partners who actually develop the
strategy for the case. As Judge Marrero notes, “intercorporate litigation”
had, by 1985, become a “major part of commercial business strategy,”
used by businesses to “further their competitive ends.”23 In such an
environment, “winning” the litigation (which in practice usually meant
settling the case on what the client deemed acceptable terms 24) became
an important corporate goal, more important even than saving money
by hiring a cheaper law firm. From the corporate counsel’s point of
view, the more important a case was to the bottom line of the
corporation, the more it was worth spending whatever was necessary to
achieve the best possible result. Accordingly, when a potential negative
transactions and cases [were] more frequently reserved for the client’s own less expensive inhouse legal staff”).
21 Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future
of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011).
22 See Casey Sullivan, Client Pitches Cost Up to $70K at Latham & Watkins, BIG L. BUS.
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/client-pitches-cost-up-to-70k-at-latham-watkins
[https://perma.cc/U5K2-UMXW].
23 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1621–22.
24 This, of course, reflects the prevailing belief that “most cases settle.” While the empirical
evidence shows this to be basically true, the settlement rate, often stated to be in the high
ninetieth percentile, may well be overstated, largely because it fails to account for all of the cases
judicially resolved prior to trial. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the
Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009); Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994) (“Oft-cited figures estimating settlement rates of between
85 and 95 percent are misleading . . . .”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?
Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004).
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outcome posed a major threat to the well-being of the company (the socalled “bet your company” case), 25 the most prudent thing for in-house
counsel to do was to find a litigator with a reputation for toughness and
success, and then give them whatever resources they said they needed to
win the case. 26
This dynamic was not lost on the litigation partners themselves,
who saw the advantages of developing reputations for toughness and
success, and for convincing in-house counsel that every case they
handled was one that potentially put the client in grave jeopardy and
that needed to be litigated fully and aggressively. 27 Even if, after
observing some pointless motion practice or paying for months of
useless discovery, the in-house counsel might begin to have doubts, the
nature of big case litigation is such that it is rarely advantageous to fire
one’s lawyer in the middle of pretrial preparation. Getting a new firm up
to speed and ensuring a smooth transition while avoiding additional
delays and duplication is quite costly and the benefits are speculative
and uncertain. 28
25 See Bet-The-Company Litigation Definition, BEST LAW., https://www.bestlawyers.com/
methodology/practice-areas/united-states/bet-the-company-litigation [https://perma.cc/5Q66TBV9] (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).
26 The point is aptly made by Dean Garth when he states:

[L]awyers in the ordinary cases have learned how to manage time and expense. They
have had to do so, since their clients will not pay for scorched earth tactics. On the
other hand, the high-stakes, high-conflict cases involve clients who pay for the
services of lawyers as warriors, and that is what they usually get.
Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets
in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998).
27 As an illustration of the kind of reputation top litigation attorneys seek, consider the
following excerpt from the professional profile of Sandra Goldstein from the Kirkland & Ellis
website:
During the past five years, Sandra has represented clients in litigation relating to
more than 30 contemplated or hostile transactions with a cumulative value of over
$400 billion. During this time, she secured more than 20 pretrial wins, including a
major summary judgment victory in a multibillion-dollar securities fraud class action
lawsuit. Sandra frequently argues as lead courtroom counsel, winning over a
dozen favorable decisions after oral argument in the past five years at both the trial
and appellate court levels concerning dispositive motions, motions for preliminary
injunctions and expedited discovery. Due to this success, she has repeatedly been
recognized as a leading trial lawyer by several professional publications.
Sandra C. Goldstein, P.C.—Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, https://www.kirkland.com/
sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&itemid=12874 [https://perma.cc/9QN7-W6QF] (last visited
Sept. 2, 2018). Goldstein is a litigation partner who recently moved to Kirkland from Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, and is said to be the highest paid female partner at a big law firm. Vivia Chen,
Is Sandra Goldstein the Highest Paid Female Partner in Big Law?, AM. LAW. (May 29, 2018, 5:05
PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/05/29/is-sandra-goldstein-the-highest-paidfemale-partner-in-big-law [https://perma.cc/D76J-4X9K].
28 This tendency to avoid short-term costs of changes unless there are strong and clear
long-term benefits to be gained is called “path dependency” and has been extensively studied by
economists and economic historians. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies,
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It should also be noted that during the last few decades there has
been substantial growth in the kinds of cases that, if not quite “bet-yourcompany” litigation, can reasonably be characterized as posing
substantial dangers to corporate bottom lines. They include not just
suits between large companies on contractual, antitrust, and intellectual
property grounds, but also tort claims for products liability, 29 securities
and other nondisclosures, and employment discrimination, all
frequently brought, or at least attempted to be brought, on a class-wide
basis. 30
Judge Marrero calls this a “paradox.” 31 The very same forces that
pushed law firms toward greater cost cutting and efficiency in most
areas were also responsible for:
The gritty grind of litigation, with all of its inefficiencies that prolong
the duration of private disputes and enlarge the grief and expenses of
clients, also serves as a hallmark of law practice profitability. In other
words, in some circumstances litigation abuse may function as a
boon to the bottom line, a financial engine working to sustain a
growing share of the legal profession’s profitability, which in turn is
grounded on a business model that internally embraces the
operational and economic efficiency that modern law practice
demands. 32

Judge Marrero is able to reach this conclusion by disaggregating
the litigation process. He shows us that the litigation partner who
ostensibly runs the case does not have total freedom to act in the way he
or she thinks best but is subject to strong influences and incentives from
other powerful actors within the decision-making structure. The most
important such actor is the client, represented by in-house counsel.
Judge Marrero tells us that “the expansion of the function, size, and
power of in-house corporate counsel” is “perhaps the most
Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989). It can lead to
“lock-ins” of inefficient technologies like left hand side driving in many countries and qwerty
keyboards. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332
(1985).
29 Litigation against tobacco companies, for example, posed little threat to such defendants
until the early 1990s, when increased involvement by state attorneys general and shifts in legal
theories emphasizing nondisclosures regarding the addictive nature of smoking greatly
increased plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in such cases. See Barbara Colombo, Tobacco
Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 373
(1999); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP L. REV. 685
(2000); Robert M. Langer, Symposium Introduction: Regulation by Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV.
1141 (2001) (describing states’ attorneys general tobacco litigation and the regulation of
tobacco by litigation); Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 183 (2001) (including pieces on tobacco litigation).
30 Marcus, supra note 4, at 1703–04.
31 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1624.
32 Id.
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consequential development affecting private law practice to occur
within the last thirty to forty years.”33 Yet in-house counsel have not
consciously encouraged the “gritty grind” of delay and inefficiency.
Rather, the impact of these tactics has been perversely negative. By
reducing the inefficiency and profitability of other types of corporate
work and routine litigation, they have caused law firms to focus more of
their attention and a greater share of their profits on big cases and big
case litigators.
Big case litigators and their firms share many incentives. Both have
an interest in increasing the billing rates and billable hours attributable
to big case litigation. Both have an interest in convincing the client that
the case they are handling is sufficiently important and poses sufficient
danger to the client that it justifies, indeed requires, the aggressive, noholds-barred approach with which it is being litigated and the bills that
go along with that approach. 34
In showing how current litigation practice is influenced by lawyers’
concern for maximizing their revenue, I do not think Judge Marrero is
necessarily condemning them for being greedy or for failing to act in the
best interests of their clients. Rather, Judge Marrero is describing the
manifestation in current litigation practice of a phenomenon that legal
theorists and economists have long known and worried about: the
tendency of agents, all agents—lawyers, corporate officers, personal
assistants, etc.—to act in their own self-interest when the constraints
and incentives under which they operate permit such wealth
maximizing behavior, even at the expense of the person or entity on
whose behalf they purport to act. Such “agency costs” have been
extensively analyzed in many institutional settings, including the
lawyer-client relationship. 35 These studies assume that all complex
institutional structures will give rise to some degree of self-benefitting
actions by agents and therefore entail some inefficiencies or loss of value
to those for whom they are acting. Such agency costs can never be
completely eliminated but can be reduced by altering institutional
incentives and constraints.
Judge Marrero describes how such agency costs can take the form
Id. at 1611.
Of course, their interests can easily diverge when it comes time to divide the revenues
attributable to those big case litigations, leading, as Judge Marrero correctly notes, to a more
“cutthroat” and individualistic mode of practice, where “attorneys reportedly vie for business
and clients not only with competing firms, but even with their own partners and associates.” Id.
at 1618.
35 An important early account of agency costs in the context of corporate governance is
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Much of this analysis in the
attorney-client context has focused on plaintiffs’ lawyers and entrepreneurial litigation. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987). See also Michael Klausner,
Geoffrey Miller & Richard Painter, Second Opinions in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REV. 1411 (1998).
33
34
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of costly abusive tactics and delay in the litigation process. He then seeks
to work backward from effects to possible causes, trying to understand
how, in a world of increasing oversight and demands for cost-cutting by
in-house counsel, inefficient litigation remains a persistent, even
growing problem. His account is an insightful one, consistent with
much of what we know about the still somewhat hidden world of law
firm governance and billing practices.
But how stable are the relationships he describes? Will clients
continue to foot the bill for what Judge Marrero tells us are wasteful and
unnecessary litigation practices? Judge Marrero notes that there have
already been “client reactions” to the inefficiencies of the present
system. 36 Moreover, his analysis clearly presents big case litigation as an
outlier in contemporary law firm practice, the one remaining area where
clients seem willing to tolerate waste and inefficiencies that they have
vigorously sought to eliminate in other practice areas. 37 Can this last
forever, or will clients eventually recognize their own self-interest and
insist that litigation be conducted with greater efficiency, frugality, and
restraint?
As Judge Marrero describes it, the current system relies on
litigation counsel convincing the client of two fundamental
propositions: (1) that the litigation facing the company poses a serious
danger to the future welfare of the corporation; and (2) that the best way
to meet that danger is with an extremely aggressive, no-holds-barred
litigation strategy. While both propositions appear highly dubious as
generalizations about the best way to litigate most corporate disputes, it
may be difficult for a client to be sure that they are not applicable to the
particular litigation in which the client is engaged. After all, the “betyour-company” case is not a complete fiction. Some litigations really do
put the corporation’s future in jeopardy, and the number of such cases
may even be growing. Many government antitrust cases fall into this
category, particularly those that seek to block mergers or alter the
structure of the business, 38 as well as patent cases involving core
36 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1628. There is some indication that corporate use of large law
firms to handle complex financial and securities litigation, such as that arising from the 2007
financial crisis, may have peaked. See Christine Simmons & Gina Passarella, A Crack in the
Wall: Elite Wall Street Firms Are Bring Put to the Test, AM. LAW. (Aug. 19, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/08/19/a-crack-in-the-wall-elite-wall-street-firmsare-being-put-to-the-test [https://perma.cc/LQT6-RMXF].
37 It should be noted that there are still a few areas of transactional practice, like corporate
restructurings and high-end mergers and acquisitions, which also generate enormous fees for a
relatively small number of law firms. See Chelsea Naso, All M&A Attorneys Make Bank, Survey
Shows, LAW360 (May 28, 2014, 8:04 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/541045/all-m-aattorneys-make-bank-survey-shows.
38 Although they produced very different ultimate results, the Justice Department’s cases
against IBM, AT&T, and Microsoft all fall into this category. See John E. Lopatka, United States
v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2000); John Pinheiro, AT&T
Divestiture & the Telecommunications Market, 2 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 303 (1987); Samuel Noah
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corporate products, 39 and mass tort lawsuits seeking damages for
widespread injuries. 40 Somewhat more complex are tort cases where
plaintiffs allege serious physical or reputational injuries, and where the
danger of potentially catastrophic damages are increased by allegations
seeking class action status or punitive damages. 41 Although big punitive
damage awards and massive class action settlements have been few and
far between, there have certainly been enough of them to concern a
cautious in-house counsel (or big case litigator who is aware that their
career can effectively end with a highly publicized loss in a big case).
Accordingly, there is generally no need for outright deception to
convince the client that a pending lawsuit poses a major danger to
corporate conduct. A consistent emphasis on possible negative
consequences can be enough.
Tactics, however, are another matter, particularly when the
aggressive, spare no expense approach of the contemporary litigator
produces big client bills with little to show for them. As previously
noted, changing lawyers in the middle of a case is hard and expensive.
Settlement, of course, is always theoretically possible, but in complex
cases where facts are in dispute and neither side really knows what
document discovery will turn up, offering serious settlement terms
before discovery is completed may be interpreted as a sign of fear or
weakness, or at least the parties may fear it will be so interpreted. 42 So
the client feels caught between a rock and a hard place, since any change
in the status quo might actually increase costs and worsen both the
litigation position of the company and the personal position of the inWeinstein, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 273 (2002).
39 See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
40 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on
Apr. 20, 2010, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014).
41 Viewed in the aggregate, most of these claims will turn out not to have been very
threatening after all. Larger class actions based on disparate tort claims are increasingly difficult
to certify, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), and awards of massive punitive
damages are also rare and can frequently be reduced by remittitur. See Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Still, immense damage awards (generally the result of jury
verdicts) are not unknown, and when they do occur, they can have disastrous consequences for
the corporate defendant involved. Recent work in behavioral theory has shown that most
people tend to overestimate the probability of the occurrence of catastrophic events like airline
crashes or terrorist attacks, particularly if previous such events are highly publicized and easy to
recall. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
42 Under most economic models of settlement behavior, cases will settle when plaintiff’s
estimate of the probability of success is equal to or below that of defendant. Problems arise,
however, when asymmetric and incomplete information causes the parties to doubt that they
have adequate information about the probability of success to justify settlement and need
further discovery to deal with that problem. For some recent attempts to model the settlement
process with discovery, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 49–52
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6960, 1999), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w6960.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXQ2-UT79]; Scott A. Moss, Litigation
Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery
Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889 (2009).
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house counsel.
Such dissatisfaction, however, can lead to instability, as clients look
to new and better ways to reduce the costs and risks of big case
litigation. Increasingly, we see litigation strategy itself becoming
disaggregated, as both firms and clients place more of the responsibility
for pretrial discovery on e-discovery service providers who have the
technical expertise to produce and review the massive amounts of
electronically stored information that constitutes the vast majority of
discovery in contemporary litigation, and can do so more cheaply and
efficiently than most law firms. 43 These e-discovery service providers,
whether operating outside the law firm or as an internal e-discovery
team, tend to view e-discovery as a task rather than an adversarial
contest. Their emphasis is on cost savings, speed, efficiency, and
accuracy of production, rather than aggressiveness or an assurance of
litigation victories. 44 In the interest of maximizing such efficiency and
cost reductions, they are also generally willing to meet and cooperate
with representatives of the opposing parties, whether lawyers or
information processors, and to cooperate more fully with each other in
the discovery process. The prevalence of such firms does seem to be
moving the discovery process in the direction of greater cooperation
and less adversarialness, 45 and judges seeking to develop reasonable
protocols for such discovery often prefer to speak to the “technical
experts” rather than to the litigators. 46 Of course, it is still mostly the
43 Some of the largest of these firms market proprietary software that can be used to store
electronic data and compile, review, and produce it in connection with discovery requests.
These firms, as well as many smaller vendors, also provide e-discovery document review and
production services, both to law firms and corporate clients. A recent survey by Relativity, one
of the largest e-discovery software vendors and service providers, found that 91% of the
corporations and law firms surveyed used at least one outside e-discovery service vendor, but
found that a majority of such firms also relied substantially on in-house e-discovery teams.
Brendan Ryan, What Clients Want from e-Discovery Solution Providers, RELATIVITY (Apr. 10,
2018), https://www.relativity.com/blog/what-clients-want-from-e-discovery-solution-providers
[https://perma.cc/8U8S-EU6P].
44 Most clients utilize outside e-discovery service providers because they believe it reduces
costs, but as more sophisticated document review systems like TAR (technology assisted
review) become more common, they may also provide technological expertise that further
improves the efficiency of the process. See Stephen Wood, The Rise of Alternative Legal Service
Providers, BIG L. BUS. (May 4, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/the-rise-of-alternative-legalservice-providers [https://perma.cc/6LVZ-VFCN].
45 See, e.g., William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Electronic discovery requires cooperation between opposing counsel and
transparency in all aspects of preservation and production of ESI. Moreover, where counsel are
using keyword searches for retrieval of ESI, they at a minimum must carefully craft the
appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI’s custodians as to the words and abbreviations
they use, and the proposed methodology must be quality control tested to assure accuracy in
retrieval and elimination of ‘false positives.’”).
46 In the seminal case of Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), one of
the first to develop a protocol for e-discovery utilizing technology assisted review, the discovery
conference at which those protocols were discussed was attended by both sides’ information
technology experts as well as by plaintiffs’ e-discovery vendor. A suggested protocol for
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litigators’ decisions that determine what amount of electronically stored
information must initially be processed and reviewed and what claims
of privilege, protection, and burdensomeness must be asserted and
adjudicated. Still, by removing some of the aggressive adversarialness
from the nuts and bolts process of producing documents, the advent of
e-discovery service providers appears to many as a useful step in
promoting cooperation and cost reduction in litigation.
Newer potential disaggregators of the litigation process, with even
greater potential for effecting change in litigation strategies, are
litigation financing firms. These are financial entities that are
increasingly being permitted, both in the United States and elsewhere,
to fund litigation expenses based on a private contractual relationship
with the parties involved. 47 With respect to plaintiffs, this generally
means agreeing to pay all or part of the expenses of the case, or simply
to pay plaintiff a lump sum in exchange for the right to all or part of the
proceeds of any litigation result or settlement. Such litigation funders,
even more than in-house counsel, have a strong incentive to focus
carefully on the relationship between the conduct of the litigation, its
costs, and the probable results. Since a plaintiff’s litigation funder has
paid a fixed amount to participate in plaintiff’s claim, the funder knows
exactly how much it needs in settlement to recognize a positive return
on its investment. It also has a strong interest in reducing litigation costs
(since it is paying directly for them), and in obtaining settlement or
litigation results more quickly (both because of the time value of money
and the need to invest in other litigations). While many view plaintiffs’
law firms as “entrepreneurial” because their cases are frequently taken
on a contingency fee basis, there is no doubt that many such lawyers feel
a personal responsibility for their clients, who may have suffered
grievous personal or pecuniary losses, have no familiarity with the
litigation process, and put their trust completely in their attorneys. 48
Such attorneys might well feel an obligation to litigate aggressively for
such clients—perhaps even beyond the point of cost-effectiveness—and
to reject or not seek settlement on terms the client might find
electronic discovery, recently promulgated by the United States District Court of Maryland,
expressly provides that among those who may attend a Rule 26(f) discovery conference are “the
designated ESI coordinator for the party; forensic experts; and in-house information system
personnel.” PAUL W. GRIMM & MICHAEL D. BERMAN, MARYLAND’S DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 25
(2007), http://www.ediscoveryllc.com/pdf/MarylandProtocol-Lexis%20Nexis-Applied-Disc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LZ4D-J7LM].
47 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Big Law Embraces Litigation Finance, BIG L. BUS. (Mar. 23,
2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/big-law-embraces-litigation-finance [https://perma.cc/S7DP3B76].
48 Such a story is compellingly told in Jonathan Harr’s account of federal litigation against
corporate defendants whose mishandling of toxic chemicals allegedly led to a cluster of cancer
cases in Woburn, Massachusetts. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). Harr portrays
plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Jan Schlichtmann, as pursuing the case so aggressively and singlemindedly that he causes severe financial injury to his firm and himself. Id.
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disappointing. With litigation funders, such concerns have been
removed. The funders are litigation-savvy repeat players who have no
qualms about cutting their losses by taking small payments to settle
claims that seem of little value or of pressing their lawyers to litigate
quickly, effectively and at low cost.
With respect to corporate defense counsel, litigation finance can
play a different but potentially equally important role. It can provide
what are effectively “reverse contingent fees.” Defense counsel and the
financing firm agree on an expected value for the case against
defendant. The finance firm then funds the litigation costs in exchange
for a percentage of any savings the client obtains from a judgment or
settlement below that expected value. 49 This removes the cost of the
litigation as a source of concern for in-house corporate counsel and also
removes any need to monitor the litigation, since the litigation financing
firm has both a strong incentive and the expertise to do that. While
many corporations carry liability insurance that includes legal fees and
other litigation-related expenses, the funding offered by the litigation
finance firm is case-specific with respect to a lawsuit that has already
been initiated. 50 At the very least, this means that a knowledgeable,
objective observer has examined the case and believes it can be resolved
for an amount less than corporate counsel has estimated. More
importantly, the funding firm’s financial stake in the outcome gives it
strong incentives to adopt a measured cost-benefit approach to how the
litigation is conducted. This could make them a useful counterbalance
to the over-aggressiveness and costly litigation strategies Judge Marrero
sees currently being followed by defense counsel. While litigation
funding is quite new and remains controversial, 51 as a potential
49 While defendant-side litigation financing is “still in the early stages of development,” it is
both theoretically possible and actively being offered by some investment advisory firms.
WESTFLEET ADVISORS, GUIDE TO LITIGATION FINANCING 3 (May 2014), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015_spring_
leadership_meeting/guide_to_litigation_financing_may_2014_charles_agee.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8E6-T4PS]; Michael McDonald, Litigation Finance for Defendants, ABOVE
L. (Mar. 28, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/litigation-finance-for-defendants
[https://perma.cc/QGX4-HDRA].
50 Many corporations today tend to self-insure, at least with respect to some levels of
liability, creating additional anxiety for general counsel that litigation finance can help solve.
51 One such controversy is whether traditional ethical rules against maintenance and
champerty should be modified or abolished, since lawyers using litigation finance firms clearly
violate such prohibitions. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Obstacles
Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 85 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin,
Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market,
53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild
West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004);
Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV.
615 (2007); James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition of an
Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223 (2003);
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); Douglas R.
Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649
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ameliorative to the “gritty grind” Judge Marrero describes, it is a trend
worth watching.
II. AN EXPANSIVE CONCEPTION OF LITIGATION ABUSE
Too much recent writing about problems with the litigation
process have been exercises in allocation of blame. 52 Plaintiffs’ lawyers
blame defense counsel for delay and increased costs, usually through
dilatory discovery practices. 53 Defense lawyers blame plaintiffs’ counsel
for similar cost and delay, mostly due to unnecessary and overbroad
discovery requests. 54 Judges and academics cite both sorts of problems
and blame litigators generally for what has come to be called “discovery
abuse.” 55 For Judge Marrero, however, even discovery abuse is just a
subset of the broader dysfunction in contemporary litigation
procedure. 56 As he sees it, lawyers are increasing costs and delay in
(2005); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011); Maya Steinitz,
Whose Claim is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011);
Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of
Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707 (2007); Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work:
An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297 (2002); Andrew Hananel & David
Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795
(2004); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems
Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 503 (2006).
52 Indeed, a recent survey of discovery abuse cases attempted to study judicial allocation of
blame. David J. Kessler, Andrea D’Ambra & Alex Altman, Quantitative Analysis of Courts’
Application of Cooperation in Discovery Disputes from July 1, 2008 to November 1, 2016 (2017),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20170126-courts-and-cooperation-a-quantitativestudy-of-how-courts-are-considering-parties-failures-to-cooperate-146092.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y427-3UUV]. It found that sanctions for non-cooperation in discovery were
overwhelmingly applied against responding, rather than requesting, parties. Id. at 2.
53 They also complain, as does Judge Marrero, that this penchant for delay is augmented by
defense counsel’s ability to bill by the hour. See Comments of Michael R. Hugo, First ViceChair, Am. Ass’n for Justice’s Section on Toxic, Envtl. and Pharm. Litig. 9–10 (Feb. 18, 2014)
(on file with author) (“It was not the plaintiff that was driving the litigation costs through the
roof—it was the counsel for the vaccine manufacturers. They were getting paid by the hour; I
was getting paid perhaps. It was in defense counsel’s interest to generate mountains of
paperwork, to fight discovery that had already been produced in other cases, to keep me
running across the continent for generally identical motions filed in 10 to 30 different courts,
and to try to win a war of attrition.”).
54 In the era of e-discovery, these concerns have been broadened to also include “overpreservation” of potentially discoverable ESI and spoliation motions relating to
nonpreservation. See Lawyers for Civil Justice, Public Comment to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules 3–4 (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/lcj_comment_
to_advisory_committee_on_civil_rules_8.30.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJS5-B4T9]. See also
Yablon, supra note 14, at 574–77.
55 See, e.g., SEDONA COOPERATION PROCLAMATION, supra note 3, at 1.
56 It should be noted, however, that, like most careful commentators, Judge Marrero
describes problems that primarily characterize “big case” litigation, high stakes lawsuits against
large entities. As a judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Judge Marrero undoubtedly sees a disproportionate number of such cases. Yet, I believe
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virtually all aspects of pretrial practice, from complaint drafting to
discovery to dispositive motions. One interesting consequence of this
broad critique of the entire system is that it tends to reduce the
culpability of any particular participant in the system, making virtually
everyone both a victim and perpetrator of some level of abusive
conduct. It also implies that there is no easy fix to the widespread
problems he describes, no federal rule change, judicial sanction, or
ethical exhortation that can bring about the changes he desires.
Judge Marrero evaluates litigation practices against an ambitious,
perhaps even idealized standard—that litigation should be as “just,
speedy, and inexpensive” as possible. 57 Measured against that standard,
contemporary litigation practice falls woefully short. Among the
litigation practices he critiques are: complaints that are too vague;
complaints that are too long; complaints that are “scattershot” or
constitute a “fishing expedition;” answers that are coy, evasive, or
withhold relevant information; lawsuits filed in an improper jurisdiction
or venue; lawsuits naming unnecessary defendants or “overstretched”
claims; motions to dismiss based on “wishful thinking;” partial motions
to dismiss that serve “no useful purpose;” motions to dismiss that are
later abandoned or withdrawn; disproportionate discovery; “discovery
about discovery;” excessive discovery; overbroad document requests;
unnecessary depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admissions;
aggravated discovery (mostly electronic); and premature, unproductive,
or baseless motions for summary judgment. 58
As a Civil Procedure teacher, I find Judge Marrero’s list quite
edifying. He condemns all of the sloppy procedural practices I warn my
students against. As a litigator, or even a scholarly observer of litigation,
however, I fear that Judge Marrero is painting with too broad a brush.
Viewed from the perspective of hindsight, unsuccessful litigation
strategies will almost always look wasteful and unnecessary, particularly
to a judge who has ruled against them. Yet from the ex ante perspective
of the lawyer considering such strategies, there may be strong reasons
for adopting them. The major reason for this is the uncertainty of the
litigation process itself.
Consider motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, which
Judge Marrero condemns as wasteful and unnecessary because in the
aggregate they have relatively low rates of success. From one
perspective, they are a perfect illustration of the insights available from
he would agree with Professor Marcus that, “careful research by the Federal Judicial Center
Research Division in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has shown that
discovery does not seem to be a significant problem in ‘normal’ litigation, probably of the sort
the framers would have anticipated.” Marcus, supra note 4, at 1709. Judge Marrero expressly
argues, however, that the costs and burdens imposed by big case litigation abuse adversely
impact the entire civil justice system. Marrero, supra note 1, at 1607.
57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
58 See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1645–70.
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Judge Marrero’s approach. Such motions are clearly permitted by the
Federal Rules and, except in the most egregious cases, can hardly be
considered abusive. Yet it is precisely because they have become such a
standard part of defense counsel’s strategy, made virtually by rote in
every large case, that Judge Marrero sees them as problematic.
Moreover, such motions can justify enormous hours of partner and
associate time in getting all the arguments just right, finding all the
potentially relevant cases, and making sure they are all cited correctly,
even for a motion that everyone understands the client is very likely to
lose. Judge Marrero condemns this as wasteful and perhaps even selfinterested action by defense counsel, and he certainly has a point. 59
From the point of view of defense counsel, however, that same low
probability motion to dismiss can look like a risk worth taking. 60 It
represents a twenty-five to thirty percent chance of a clear and complete
victory, 61 a victory that will enhance their reputation and endear them
to the client. The only downside risk is the added cost and delay of the
motion, and, as Judge Marrero suggests, that will be viewed by most
defense counsel with mixed emotions. The calculus might change if
defense counsel knew with virtual certainty that the motion would be
denied, but the legal authorities themselves rarely provide such
certainty. Indeed, the standard for deciding motions to dismiss has itself
been a subject of substantial litigation uncertainty recently, and appears
to have shifted somewhat in favor of defendants. 62 Moreover, different
judges and different circuits are known to take somewhat varying views
on how weak a claim must appear before it is dismissed at the pretrial
stage. Given such uncertainty, it is not difficult for a good litigator to
formulate an argument for dismissal or summary judgment which
appears to them to be at least as good as arguments that have been
accepted by courts in other cases. Lawyers, of course, are not immune to
their own arguments, and frequently manage to convince themselves
that their motion has merit even if it subsequently fails to convince the
judge. 63
Id. at 1652–53.
There is substantial academic literature on why lawyers bring cases with low probabilities
of success. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot
Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567 (2000); Charles M. Yablon, The
Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV.
65 (1996).
61 This is Judge Marrero’s estimate, based on data from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, of the overall rate at which motions to dismiss are granted in their
entirety in federal civil cases. See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1653 nn.109–11.
62 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See also Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV.
2117 (2015).
63 See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 579–80 (2013) (discussion of the cognitive bias of over59
60
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Moreover, even when lawyers know their motion is weak and likely
to be denied, they may still have what appear to them to be good reasons
to make it. The client might demand it, expect it, or at least strongly
encourage it. Defense counsel may convince themselves, as well as the
client, that even if the motion is unsuccessful, it will have corollary
benefits like “educating the judge” concerning the nature of defendant’s
arguments, or demonstrating to opposing counsel the strength of their
cases and their intent to litigate aggressively.
Such questionable grounds for making questionable motions, of
course, grow out of precisely the lawyer-client dynamic Judge Marrero
describes. In critiquing them, I don’t think Judge Marrero is calling for
the abolition of dispositive motions or a stricter standard for
sanctioning lawyers who make such losing motions. He is simply
showing that the perverse incentives of the present litigation system
result in too many weak motions being made, with too much money,
time, and energy expended on them. That is why he critiques not just
the motions themselves, but the overwritten, overbroad way they are
made and supported with extraneous exhibits, 64 as well as the useless
motions that seek to dismiss irrelevant parts of a lawsuit, 65 or are
withdrawn without adjudication. 66 He conjoins the problem of too
many dispositive motions with the problem of too much time and
energy spent on dispositive motion practice, the problem of too much
discovery with the problem of disproportionate discovery and the
problem of discovery delay. To Judge Marrero, they are all
manifestations of the skewed incentives under which much
contemporary litigation takes place.
By focusing on the complex incentives that cause lawyers to litigate
expensively and ineffectively, Judge Marrero effectively lessens the
distinction, frequently found in the literature, between the “ethical”
lawyer who advocates zealously within the scope of the rules and the
unethical one who abuses and violates those rules. Judge Marrero’s
expansive list of litigation abuses shows that it is possible to advocate
vigorously within the rules, still do so in a wasteful and ill-advised
manner, and that such advocacy has a deleterious impact on the parties
involved and on the system as a whole. 67 For Judge Marrero, the
problem is not a few bad actors, or even a few categories of lawyers he
views as sleazy or unprincipled. Rather, it is the system itself that
presents lawyers with powerful incentives to not only do what is
optimism among lawyers).
64 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1664–65.
65 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1654.
66 Marrero, supra note 1, at 1655–56.
67 In this respect, Judge Marrero’s position is close to that of the Sedona Cooperation
Proclamation, which also argued that “zealous advocacy” does not require litigation of
unnecessary discovery disputes. See SEDONA COOPERATION PROCLAMATION, supra note 3, at 1.
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necessary to present their clients’ case in a clear and convincing manner,
but also do far more than is necessary, to leave no stone unturned, no
case uncited, no argument unmade, to present to the client a vision of
aggressive advocacy, as well as an extremely expensive legal bill. An
analogy might be made to the medical doctor who, seeking to provide
their patient with the best possible care, orders an immense battery of
expensive tests to rule out a whole series of potential maladies. This is
not malpractice. All the tests are justifiable, if not strictly required, and
there is no doubt that the fact the doctors’ office makes a profit on every
test has an impact on whether they are ordered. Still, medical costs soar,
and the system as a whole is damaged. 68
By focusing on systemic problems, Judge Marrero not only avoids
placing too much blame on any single group of individuals, but also
suggests that the solution to the problem cannot come from any single
source or change in the way litigation is conducted, supervised, or
funded. Rather, Judge Marrero’s broad systemic approach to the
problem also implies that the problem cannot be solved but can, at best,
be gradually improved, and that such improvement cannot come from
one or a few big changes, but from a much larger number of smaller
changes. Lawyers cannot and should not, as a general matter, be
prevented from or sanctioned for making dispositive motions or seeking
extensive discovery. Rather, the incentives lawyers face when
considering such strategies must be changed more subtly, so that the
decision to litigate more aggressively and spend more client money does
not always appear to litigators as the safest, most lucrative, and most
obvious choice.
III. RATIONAL VS. IRRATIONAL INCENTIVES TO LITIGATE
Most writing about litigation misconduct starts from one of two
assumptions about the lawyers who engage in it. Some portray these
lawyers as rational actors who, in an effort to maximize positive
68 Judge Marrero’s Essay includes his own medical analogy, in which he compares weak
summary judgment motions to a “common illness” for which “surgeons routinely perform an
invasive operation during which, in about seventy to eighty-five percent of the cases, the
patients’ condition worsens, and many even die . . . .” Marrero, supra note 1, at 1663. He
contrasts that with an “alternative treatment” for the same condition with a success rate of over
ninety percent. Id. The legal procedure that corresponds to that “alternative treatment” is not
entirely clear, but it presumably involves preparing for trial and probable settlement. The
analogy is not a bad one, although losing summary judgment defendants do not risk death, just
a depleted pocket book, and are still free to subsequently seek settlement. Judge Marrero’s
argument is that everyone would be better off if the time wasted on summary judgment
motions was spent on settling cases quickly and efficiently. As a general statement about the
health of the entire civil justice system, this is probably true, but, for the reasons stated above, it
is still hard to envision that such an argument will convince litigators not to make potentially
dispositive motions in a particular case.
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litigation outcomes for their client, take rational actions designed to
improve their litigation position. Sometimes this works, but frequently
it is met by similar actions by their opponents that result in a “prisoner’s
dilemma” or other game theoretic conclusion in which abusive conduct
by both sides makes everybody worse off. 69 The alternative assumption
is that litigators, even if they start out acting rationally, frequently get
caught up in the combative, aggressive nature of adversarial litigation,
particularly without effective judicial oversight. 70 They may view their
opponents as stubborn, hostile, or even evil (not so hard when the
opponent is a large corporation), and such dislike can grow into the
irrational “scorched earth” tactics that characterize the abusive conduct
found in some contemporary lawsuits. Each approach implies its own
preferred solution. For those adopting a rational game-theoretic
approach, it is usually a change in the rules of the “game” that presents
the parties with more information about the other side’s actions, thereby
promoting more optimal benefit-maximizing behavior by both sides.
This is generally done by promoting or even mandating more meetings
and conferences between the parties and their lawyers. Those who view
the problem as primarily one of lawyer irrationality tend to see the
solution as a combination of exhortations pointing out the far greater
benefits of cooperation over conflict, coupled with closer case
management and the threat of severe sanctions for the most egregious
wrongdoers. 71 Neither solution has been very effective thus far, raising
doubts as to whether either of the analyses of lawyer conduct on which
69 The classic example of this form of analysis is John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb:
The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569
(1989). Written by a defense analyst for the RAND Corporation (who also had a J.D. from
Yale), it used game-theoretic models to analyze under what circumstances it was a winning
strategy for adversarial lawyers to engage in discovery abuse and when it would lead to a
disadvantageous prisoner’s dilemma. In developing his arguments, he drew on theories of
nuclear deterrence. While his models made varying assumptions about the relative wealth and
information available to the parties involved, they always assumed that the participants acted in
strictly rational ways. Id. Other authors also make the strict rationality assumption. See Robert
D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
435, 452–54 (1994); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery
Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 63–65 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 641 (1989).
70 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505,
517 (2000) (“[T]he cooperative ethos of discovery clashes directly and irreconcilably with the
oppositional character and partisan norms of all other phases and attributes of adversarial
litigation.”); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 11 (rejecting prisoner’s dilemma in favor of a
model stressing agency theory and reputational concerns); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1984) (“Attorneys, steeped in the grand
tradition of the litigator, are trained to be aggressive, adversarial animals and to employ every
weapon in their arsenal to achieve the aims of their clients and to frustrate those of their
opponents. It is unrealistic to expect them to act in a cooperative spirit or adhere to Marquess
of Queensberry rules on what has become the central battlefield of modern litigation.”); see also
Yablon, supra note 11.
71 For a game-theoretic argument that closer case management cannot generally be effective
in applying proportionality review, see Moss, supra note 42.
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they are based is completely accurate. 72
Judge Marrero does not begin with behavioral assumptions, but
with observations. He observes that lawyers engaged in litigation do not
act freely, but are constrained. They are constrained by the Federal
Rules and fiduciary duties but, even more importantly, by expectations
and demands of their clients, partners, associates, adversaries, and the
decision-makers before whom they appear. The lawyers he sees do not
adopt long term litigation strategies, or, if they do, those strategies are
constantly being interrupted by demands placed on them by clients who
seek better results for lower costs, partners who seek better results for
higher billable hours, associates who must be induced to help produce
those better results and higher billable hours, adversaries who seek to
prevent any positive result but do not care much about billable hours,
and decision-makers who want the rules followed and litigation
conducted in the most just, speedy, and inexpensive possible way. With
all those constraints and demands, the question whether lawyers will act
rationally or irrationally seems somewhat beside the point. They will not
so much act as react, reflecting the pressures and constraints placed on
them. How they will act in any particular situation is hard to predict,
since the constellation of forces acting on them will be different for
different cases and even at different times and stages in the litigation
process. 73
Accordingly, in Judge Marrero’s account of litigation conduct,
although lawyers do engage in mostly rational cost-benefit analyses in
deciding on a course of action, no theoretical model can predict what
that action will be in any given instance. That is because the
constellation of demands and constraints those lawyers face at any given
moment are so complex and varied that they cannot be reduced to any
theoretical model. Consider, for example, a motion to dismiss, one with
a very small chance of success, the kind Judge Marrero considers
wasteful and abusive. Assume the lawyer contemplating making such a
motion shares Judge Marrero’s view of the merits. That does not mean
her only “rational” decision is to forego the motion, or that if she makes
it she is acting irrationally. She also must consider how the client will
72 With the advent of e-discovery and its potential for production of massive amounts of
potentially unreviewable documents, it was suggested that the need for cooperation and
coordination would become apparent to all litigators, rational or not, and lead to a reduction in
abusive practices. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy eDiscovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, Section III.A (2004). The fact that this has not
apparently occurred strongly supports the view of current litigation pressures Judge Marrero
presents in his Essay.
73 Judge Marrero spends many pages of his Essay noting the human toll that changes in big
firm practice have had on lawyers at those firms. Among the changes he notes are higher fees
and salaries, but also greater disparities in compensation, greater difficulty collecting on bills,
more willingness to hire lateral associates and lateral partners, and an overall culture of
“extreme competitiveness which characterizes contemporary law practice.” Marrero, supra note
1, at 1613–18.
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react to her decision. Will general counsel be pleased by the judicious
cost savings or disturbed by the lack of aggression? Will her partners be
upset by the loss of potential billings? How angry will the judge be over
what is likely to be perceived as a weak, unnecessary motion? How
much damage will it do to defendant’s overall litigation position? Is
plaintiff likely to move for sanctions under Rule 11? Might they win? All
of these and other considerations will vary from issue to issue, from case
to case, and from lawyer to lawyer. 74
While Judge Marrero’s analysis does not permit us to create a
model to predict litigation behavior, it does permit us to isolate and
distinguish various constraints and incentives that are acting on lawyers
and to analyze the relative strength of those constraints and incentives
in most cases. Indeed, it his critique of many of those incentives,
particularly those imposed by contemporary big firm practice, that
constitutes the heart of his Essay. Equally important, however, is Judge
Marrero’s systemic approach to litigation abuse, the way he sees every
part of the problem as related to every other part.
IV. IS LITIGATION ABUSE ONE PROBLEM OR MANY PROBLEMS?
This brings us to a final innovative aspect of Judge Marrero’s Essay,
the way it simultaneously permits us to analyze litigation abuse as both
one problem and as many interrelated problems. Again, this is a subject
on which prior literature has divided. From one perspective, the entire
history of Federal Rules revisions was seen as a prolonged attempt to
deal with litigation abuse as a series of piecemeal problems (e.g.,
frivolous complaints, excessive discovery demands, intentional
destruction of evidence) whose solutions were sought in specific Rule
changes. 75 Another school of thought, however, saw one fundamental
problem in the way lawyers conducted litigation, 76 and sought to solve
74

Consider this account of contemporary lawyer conduct by Judge Marrero:

[C]ontemporary litigation has spawned an expanding progeny of unnecessary
methods, at best dubious, at worst outrageous. In aggravated forms, this development
engenders ever deeper unhappiness as litigators, confronting the rougher world of
economics, keener competition, and far bigger stakes that characterize law practice
today, vie with one another to achieve a sharper edge in court proceedings.
Marrero, supra note 1, at 1623. I would submit that the “deeply unhappy litigators” he describes
here are acting neither fully rationally nor irrationally, but are just trying to cope, as best they
can, with an increasingly pressured and competitive environment.
75 Marcus, supra note 4, at 1710–26.
76 Another attempt at a fairly radical change in the way parties obtained information in
litigation was the introduction of mandatory initial disclosures in 1993 pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), a Rule whose scope was sharply limited by amendments in 2000.
See Emily C. Gainor, Initial Disclosures and Discovery Reform in the Wake of Plausible Pleading
Standards, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1441, 1469 (2011) (noting that presently “initial disclosures assume a
relatively minor role in document discovery in the American judicial system”); William W.
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that problem through greater information exchange among lawyers,
more extensive judicial supervision of the pretrial process, 77 or
exhortations for greater cooperation among litigators. 78
Judge Marrero’s analysis combines both of these approaches. On
one hand, he sees virtually all contemporary procedural issues as
interrelated manifestations of a single systemic problem: the skewed
incentives that litigators face in big case litigation. By the same token,
however, those skewed incentives are presented not so much as a single
problem, but as a constellation of forces that push and pull litigation in
different directions at different times and in different cases. It is this
systemic complexity that makes it so hard to bring about significant
changes, either by amending specific Federal Rules or by broader but
more subtle attempts to influence lawyer behavior.
It is not that Rule amendments and other procedural changes fail
to have an impact. Rather, it is that the effect of those changes will be
unpredictable and may be hard to discern if other changes in the system
are happening at the same time that are either pushing lawyers to act in
contrary ways or in ways different than those anticipated by the rule
drafters. 79 For example, consider the recent changes in the Federal Rules
designed to reduce discovery costs by imposing proportionality limits
on the general obligation to produce all relevant information. Other
things being equal, one would expect this to reduce the amount of
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
703, 721–22 (1989) (proposing a comprehensive initial disclosure scheme).
77 Calls for more effective case management have also been a persistent theme in the
debates over discovery abuse. In 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. § 471 (1992), which required all federal district courts to develop “civil justice expense
and delay reduction plans,” which were periodically evaluated and led to changes in both
district court practices and in the Federal Rules. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF1990: FINAL REPORT 11 (May 1997), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/2017/CJRA-6-2-%20Civil%20Justice%20Reform%20Act%20Final%20Report%205-97.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A92L-99EF]. Yet, with the possible exception of the “rocket dockets,”
discussed infra at Section IV.A, the impact of such changes appears to have been marginal at
best.
78 The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation is the most ambitious recent attempt
at such exhortation. Its drafters did not rely on the Proclamation alone, but, as they state:
The Cooperation Proclamation acknowledged that what is required is a “paradigm
shift for the discovery process” and that The Sedona Conference envisioned a threepart process: (1) awareness (the Proclamation itself), (2) commitment (the writing of
a Brandeis brief-style “The Case for Cooperation” developing a detailed
understanding and full articulation of the issues and changes needed to obtain
cooperative fact-finding, and (3) tools—“developing and distributing practical ‘tool
kits’ to train and support lawyers . . . in techniques of discovery cooperation,
collaboration, and transparency.”
SEDONA COOPERATION PROCLAMATION, supra note 3 (Guidance for Litigators & In-House
Counsel).
79 This seems to be Judge Marrero’s view. He spends twenty-four pages of his Essay
describing recent changes in the structure of law firms and nature of big firm practice. Marrero,
supra note 1, at 1608–32. He mentions amendments to the Federal Rules designed to curb
discovery abuse only once and states that they have “had little success.” Id. at 1642.
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discovery taken in federal cases. But it is highly unlikely that other
systemic inputs have stayed equal. If greater amounts of potentially
relevant electronically stored information have become available
(through smart phones, social media, etc.), 80 and if law firms are
increasingly looking to e-discovery as both a source of billable hours
and a profit center for the firm, then any reduction in e-discovery costs
due to the rule change may be small and will be overshadowed by other
systemic factors that cause e-discovery costs to increase. 81 Similarly, if
the pleading standards are heightened in an effort to eliminate cases
with little or no evidentiary support at an early stage in the proceedings,
but client and other financial pressure to bring such cases remains
strong, the effect may not be so much to reduce the number of
pleadings, but to incentivize plaintiffs’ lawyers to make them longer and
more complicated. The complexity of the system means that the
incentives and constraints under which lawyers operate are many and
constantly changing, and the most important motivations in a given
case are not necessarily the ones most obvious to outside observers.
A.

A Brief Interlude to Discuss the “Rocket Dockets”

Before proceeding to the final Section of this Comment, we should
take a few moments to consider one of the most ambitious attempts at
procedural reforms in recent years: the advent of so-called “rocket
dockets” in the Eastern District of Virginia and some other federal
courts. These represent conscious attempts to shake up the status quo by
focusing all participants in the litigation process on a single measurable
and attainable goal, a substantial reduction in the time between filing
and final disposition of civil cases. 82 This generally requires a substantial
increase in case management, the degree of oversight of the pretrial

80 See, e.g., George A. Zimmerman & Giyoung Song, Eliminating Asymmetrical Discovery to
Resolve Disputes on the Merits, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 6, 2014) (arguing that technological changes in
the amount of potential discoverable ESI render contemplated Rule changes inadequate.)
81 Judge Marrero does not appear to be a big fan of sanctions, apparently because he sees
lawyer misconduct as not something lawyers freely choose, but something imposed on them by
economic and competitive pressure. Accordingly, he doubts “the efficacy of these punitive
measures,” like Rules 11, 26, and 37, and would favor instead “new remedial responses . . . more
specifically targeted” and “uniquely designed to address current circumstances.” Marrero, supra
note 1, at 1683.
82 The reforms in the Eastern District of Virginia, for example, as well as the term “rocket
docket” itself, were developed by then–Chief Judge Albert Vickers Bryan Jr. of that court.
Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civil Justice
Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 800 (1998); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent
Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985-2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 60 (2011); Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molasses in the Rocket Docket,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at C04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A3007-2004Oct2.html [https://perma.cc/UX22-UZ46].
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process exercised by judges and magistrate judges. 83 In “rocket docket”
courts, judges set strict deadlines for completion of discovery, 84 limit the
number of witnesses and exhibits, and very rarely grant extensions or
modifications once these limitations are established. 85 Lawyers who
litigate before these courts are well aware of those requirements and
adjust their litigation strategies accordingly. The result is that these
districts are always among the leaders in the country in the speed at
which cases are concluded, generally posting median times of only a
little over twelve months from filing to disposition. 86
This success in reducing litigation delay, however, has not come
without controversy. Many argue that it has increased the cost of
litigation, since “[i]t is expected that litigants will allocate trial-sized
teams from the outset, as the high volume of work and the limited
period of time does not permit incrementalism.” 87 Firms that have
extensive experience in practicing in the rocket dockets market that to
clients as a unique and desirable expertise, one for which they
presumably charge a premium. Such firms may also benefit from the
fact that the Eastern District of Virginia and other rocket dockets very
rarely grant motions to transfer venue to other districts that tolerate
more leisurely litigation styles. 88 The result is to limit the law firm
options available to clients who are sued in such districts, which
presumably also increases their costs.
Fairness concerns have also been raised regarding the procedural
constraints imposed by the rocket dockets. Some have argued that they
favor plaintiffs, particularly in litigation like patent cases, where
plaintiffs can take as long as they like developing a case prior to filing,
but defendants are then presented with a very limited window of time to
complete pretrial discovery and develop a defense. Indeed, there is some
empirical evidence that plaintiffs are choosing to file patent cases in
districts with rocket dockets based on this perceived procedural
advantage. Others criticize the potential injustice of firm trial dates and
pretrial deadlines with limited opportunities for extensions as failing to
83 Vishnubhakat, supra note 82, at 61–62. Jeffrey Kelley, A District Court That’s in High
Demand, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, June 25, 2006, at D1.
84 In case management studies unrelated to rocket dockets, a district court’s “median days
to discovery cutoff” was found to be a “statistically significant predictor of time to disposition.”
James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace &
Mary E. Vaiana, Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act
Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 667 (1998).
85 It was said of Judge Bryan that “the only grounds for [which he would permit] a delay
were a death in the family—your own.” Vishnubhakat, supra note 82, at 62. Markon, supra note
82.
86 See Robert M. Tata, Virginia’s ‘Rocket Docket’ Continues to Roar, LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2015,
10:13 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/644064/virginia-s-rocket-docket-continues-toroar.
87 Vishnubhakat, supra note 82, at 62.
88 Id. at 65.
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meet the fundamental requirement that procedural rules should be
modified to meet the needs of the individual case. They argue that, with
all the emphasis placed on speedy resolution of disputes, the other two
aspects of the Rule 1 triumvirate, expense reduction and justice, may be
getting short shrift.
To be sure, there are counterarguments, and rocket dockets have
many defenders. Delay, of course, can also increase expenses, and justice
delayed can be justice denied. Clogged dockets may benefit defendants
at least as much as speedy ones benefit plaintiffs. Moreover, the rocket
docket is not an all-or-nothing proposition. The standing rules and
procedural innovations that constitute it can be adopted to various
degrees, and many other districts have done precisely that. The
appropriate resolution of these questions is well beyond the scope of this
Comment.
Still, what this interlude has shown is the basic validity of Judge
Marrero’s complex systemic approach to litigation abuse and litigation
reform. It shows that even a highly focused effort to change just one
aspect of the litigation system will necessarily have significant and
largely unpredictable effects on other aspects of the system. So, reducing
delay has implications for law firm structure and competition,
necessitates changing standards for venue transfers and extensions of
time limits, and may well affect the fundamental fairness of the
adversarial relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. To be sure,
changes can be made and can even be effective, but they should be made
with caution and careful consideration of all of their potential effects.
This is worth keeping in mind as we move to the final Section of this
piece.
V. A CONSIDERATION OF REMEDIES
It may seem a strange thing to say about Judge Marrero’s 93-page
Essay, but I wish it were a little longer. Although he gives us an
exhaustive account of the deficiencies of current big case litigation
practice and its complex relationship to law firm growth and fee
structures, he has relatively little to say about potential remedies for the
problems he describes. In some respects, this is not surprising. Judge
Marrero is not talking about a particular problem or defect in the
litigation system. He is talking about the system itself and the way it
currently operates. Indeed, it may even be slightly misleading to
describe his piece, as I have consistently done here, as an essay on
“litigation abuse.” Judge Marrero makes it clear that he is not focused
exclusively, or even primarily, on “abuses” of the system, but on the
system itself in its current ordinary operation. As he notes, “the
burgeoning litigation cost and abuse concerns at the heart of the
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controversy today derives not so much from deliberate misconduct by
practitioners—practices that are already unlawful—but from less visible
though more extensive and pivotal forces: counsel’s subterranean
actions that governing rules do not explicitly proscribe.” 89
This makes the question of sanctions or punishments for abusive
conduct somewhat beside the point, since it is hard to justify penalizing
attorney conduct that is not expressly forbidden. 90 Accordingly, Judge
Marrero’s systemic approach requires consideration of more systemic
reforms, not to deter particularly egregious conduct, but to change the
way lawyers approach the decision-making process, to alter the complex
calculus of considerations that increase the costs and delays endemic in
the current system. 91 As we noted on our brief prior consideration of
rocket docket courts, such changes are possible, and can have
immediate and profound effects on the way litigation is conducted. The
challenge is to make sure that such changes are both effective in
accomplishing their goals and do not distort or impair the litigation
process in other ways. 92
Judge Marrero extensively discusses only one serious reform of the
current system—a change in the fee shifting rules to encourage greater
use of the English rule, allocating all or part of the winning party’s legal
fees to the losing party, or perhaps the losing party’s law firm. This
proposal is consistent with Judge Marrero’s general approach. It focuses
directly on the financial incentives lawyers and clients face in
conducting litigation and seeks to alter those incentives to make lawyers
think twice about pursuing unnecessary litigation tactics by increasing
the probability that the costs of such tactics may be imposed on them or
their clients.
Yet Judge Marrero’s proposal for additional fee shifting is offered
tentatively and incrementally, not as a wholesale, across-the-board rule
change applicable in every case. 93 It would apparently function as a
rebuttable presumption even in the limited group of cases to which it
See Marrero, supra note 1, at 1686.
Judge Marrero also thinks the efficacy of the existing sanctions in the Federal Rules is
“doubtful at best.” Id. at 1683.
91 Judge Marrero seeks “new remedial responses” that are “more specifically targeted, as
well as uniquely designed to address current circumstances for which existing procedures and
penalties do not make adequate provision.” Id.
92 It is also worth noting that, from an economic perspective, the social cost of litigation
abuse (which also includes waste of public resources like the courts) will always be higher than
just the costs it imposes on the parties. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 42, at 46–48, 52.
93 Judge Marrero recognizes the legitimacy of the policy underlying the American Rule, that
“litigants who have colorable if not sure-bet claims or defenses should not be inhibited from
pressing them because of fear of incurring liability to pay their opponents’ legal costs in the
event they ultimately do not prevail.” Marrero, supra note 1, at 1687. He proposes to limit fee
shifting to those particular cases where the costs of litigation change from being “an
inconvenient though tolerable and not necessarily wrongful demand” to those cases where it
becomes “more and more disproportionate and unjust” and thereby “inflicts extensive injury,
in monetary and other values, on a prevailing party.” Id. at 1688.
89
90
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would potentially be applicable. 94 The desire to focus on the financial
incentives for excessive litigation tactics is consistent with Judge
Marrero’s overall analysis, which convincingly shows how an increase in
such incentives in recent years has exacerbated litigation problems. It
makes sense to try to limit those incentives through fee shifting, but also
to recognize that the incentives and constraints under which lawyers
operate in different cases require that fee shifting be utilized both
judiciously and where it will be most effective.
This is where I wish Judge Marrero’s piece had been just a little bit
longer, because I fear that the need to apply an expanded fee shifting
policy equitably and judiciously may also undercut its effectiveness in
big case litigation. 95 Consider first the vexing question of the
relationship between winning and litigating excessively. As Judge
Marrero notes, there is no guarantee that the party that loses in the
litigation will exclusively or even primarily be the one who used costly
and unnecessary tactics. 96 If so, why utilize the English Rule, which
entitles whichever party ultimately prevails to recover fees, rather than
an expanded version of Rule 11 or other existing Federal Rules that shift
the costs of responding to unwarranted motions, abusive discovery
requests, or other specific pretrial practices? Wouldn’t greater deterrent
effect be achieved if it is the excessive tactic itself that triggers the fee
shifting, irrespective of who prevails? This also has the advantage of
allowing the issue to be addressed by the court during pretrial
proceedings themselves, rather than wait for an ultimate resolution of
the merits. It also permits fee shifting to be utilized in the large number
of cases that will terminate in settlement, where there will be no
prevailing party with a right to seek legal fees.
Judge Marrero also notes that, in the appropriate case, costs for
unnecessary and wasteful litigation expenses should be imposed on the
lawyers or law firms rather than on the clients. But how is such a
determination to be made, other than in cases of plaintiffs in
contingency fee litigation, where it is probably least necessary? 97 With
94 Judge Marrero says that, as the injury imposed by litigation costs rises, the “onus” should
shift and “should justify compensating the prevailing party as appropriate.” Marrero, supra
note 1, at 1688. Presumably, the “appropriateness” of cost shifting would still be a matter for
determination in each individual case.
95 Judge Marrero presumably likes the somewhat automatic nature of the English Rule,
which imposes costs without assigning blame and also therefore functions as a useful ex ante
deterrent against abusive tactics like spoliation, which may increase a lawyer’s chance of losing
the case. See id. at 1684 n.163. Unfortunately, a selective case-by-case application of the English
Rule would undercut those effects. The current structure of Rules 26(c) and 37(a), which
expressly provide for a presumption of fee shifting with respect to certain types of discovery
motions, would seem to provide a more useful template for the kind of deterrence desired.
96 Id. at 1690.
97 If such cases do not settle, the inability or unwillingness of plaintiffs’ counsel to recover
legal fees (or even court costs) from their own clients already represents a considerable
disincentive to engage in wasteful pretrial tactics.
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respect to wasteful tactics initiated by large law firms supervised by
corporate counsel, a major focus of Judge Marrero’s attention, it is hard
to see how blame for such tactics can be allocated without an extensive
inquiry into the law firm decision-making process, which might well
intrude on attorney-client communications and would certainly
constitute extraneous “discovery about discovery.”98
Finally, will a greater willingness to impose legal fees on either the
losing or the more wastefully litigious party actually deter the kind of
conduct that is the subject of Judge Marrero’s concern? Here, I’m afraid,
Judge Marrero’s own analysis can give us little comfort. He has shown
how the increasingly expensive and time-consuming strategies of
contemporary big case litigation grow out of complex social, economic,
and technological changes in law firm structure, corporate governance,
information processing, and other systemic developments. It is hard to
imagine that greater judicial willingness to shift fees in some portion of
such cases will stop big firm litigators from seeking to maximize their
revenues, corporations from seeking competitive advantages in the
courts, or litigants from conducting exhaustive inquiries into
electronically stored information in the hopes of finding “smoking
guns.”
Judge Marrero’s complex analysis suggests that positive change can
only come incrementally from many subtle shifts in the incentives and
constraints that operate in contemporary litigation practice. 99 Greater
judicial willingness to shift costs in the appropriate case might well be
one such factor. Equally important, however, is the recognition, central
to Judge Marrero’s approach, that litigation abuse and excess are not
just problems for the parties involved but have deleterious effects on the
justice system as a whole. Judges supervising pretrial proceedings,
motivated by that fundamental insight, can surely find many techniques
for altering the cost-benefit analysis under which lawyers too frequently
choose strategies that add cost and delay. They might adopt some of the
techniques of the rocket dockets, as well as the expanded approach to
fee shifting Judge Marrero advocates. Following on Judge Marrero’s
analysis, it might also be possible to encourage greater participation by
other actors in the system who have incentives to reduce costs. In-house
counsel can be asked to participate in pretrial and discovery conferences
98 On a related topic, I believe Judge Marrero was too hasty in rejecting all “discovery about
discovery” as wasteful. I have argued elsewhere that certain techniques, like sampling of a
selected portion of a large amount of requested and discoverable information, may enable the
court to achieve a faster and more informed resolution of the matter, often by shifting
discovery costs in a manner similar to the one envisioned by Judge Marrero. It allows the court
to make a more informed decision about whether to permit or deny the entire request, or to
shift, all or some of the costs related to it. Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 16.
99 For a similar approach, see Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to
Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 495 (2013).
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and technical e-discovery experts can be involved and can be helpful in
drafting new protocols to reduce costs with respect to innovations like
technology assisted document review. The possibility of litigation
funding firms to reduce costs and restrain unnecessary litigation
expenses should also be explored.
As Judge Marrero has shown us, the practice of litigation has
changed enormously in recent years. It is changing still, in ways that are
obvious, and in others that are hard to detect. But as his valuable
contribution reminds us, we must try to see the system whole, in all its
complexity, if we are to achieve meaningful improvements.

